commit 930b64ca0c upstream.
Currently, nfsd_proc_stat_init() ignores the return value of
svc_proc_register(). If the procfile creation fails, then the kernel
will WARN when it tries to remove the entry later.
Fix nfsd_proc_stat_init() to return the same type of pointer as
svc_proc_register(), and fix up nfsd_net_init() to check that and fail
the nfsd_net construction if it occurs.
svc_proc_register() can fail if the dentry can't be allocated, or if an
identical dentry already exists. The second case is pretty unlikely in
the nfsd_net construction codepath, so if this happens, return -ENOMEM.
Reported-by: syzbot+e34ad04f27991521104c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/67a47501.050a0220.19061f.05f9.GAE@google.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.9
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4990d09843 upstream.
Jeff says:
Now that I look, 1b3e26a5cc is wrong. The patch on the ml was correct, but
the one that got committed is different. It should be:
status = decode_cb_op_status(xdr, OP_CB_GETATTR, &cb->cb_status);
if (unlikely(status || cb->cb_status))
If "status" is non-zero, decoding failed (usu. BADXDR), but we also want to
bail out and not decode the rest of the call if the decoded cb_status is
non-zero. That's not happening here, cb_seq_status has already been checked and
is non-zero, so this ends up trying to decode the rest of the CB_GETATTR reply
when it doesn't exist.
Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219737
Fixes: 1b3e26a5cc ("NFSD: fix decoding in nfs4_xdr_dec_cb_getattr")
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1b3e26a5cc upstream.
If a client were to send an error to a CB_GETATTR call, the code
erronously continues to try decode past the error code. It ends
up returning BAD_XDR error to the rpc layer and then in turn
trigger a WARN_ONCE in nfsd4_cb_done() function.
Fixes: 6487a13b5c ("NFSD: add support for CB_GETATTR callback")
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a3672304ab upstream.
If an active rsb is not hashed anymore and this could occur because we
releases and acquired locks we need to signal the followed code that
the lookup failed. Since the lookup was successful, but it isn't part of
the rsb hash anymore we need to signal it by setting error to -EBADR as
dlm_search_rsb_tree() does it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5be323b0c6 ("dlm: move dlm_search_rsb_tree() out of lock")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 94e6e889a7 upstream.
If an inactive rsb is not hashed anymore and this could occur because we
releases and acquired locks we need to signal the followed code that the
lookup failed. Since the lookup was successful, but it isn't part of the
rsb hash anymore we need to signal it by setting error to -EBADR as
dlm_search_rsb_tree() does it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 01fdeca1cc ("dlm: use rcu to avoid an extra rsb struct lookup")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6f8a394aa9 upstream.
Fix regression in mounts to e.g. onedrive shares.
Generally, reparse points are processed by the SMB server during the
SMB OPEN request, but there are few reparse points which do not have
OPEN-like meaning for the SMB server and has to be processed by the SMB
client. Those are symlinks and special files (fifo, socket, block, char).
For Linux SMB client, it is required to process also name surrogate reparse
points as they represent another entity on the SMB server system. Linux
client will mark them as separate mount points. Examples of name surrogate
reparse points are NTFS junction points (e.g. created by the "mklink" tool
on Windows servers).
So after processing the name surrogate reparse points, clear the
-EOPNOTSUPP error code returned from the parse_reparse_point() to let SMB
server to process reparse points.
And remove printing misleading error message "unhandled reparse tag:" as
reparse points are handled by SMB server and hence unhandled fact is normal
operation.
Fixes: cad3fc0a4c ("cifs: Throw -EOPNOTSUPP error on unsupported reparse point type from parse_reparse_point()")
Fixes: b587fd1286 ("cifs: Treat unhandled directory name surrogate reparse points as mount directory nodes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Junwen Sun <sunjw8888@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Junwen Sun <sunjw8888@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2510859475 upstream.
The echo_interval is not limited in any way during mounting,
which makes it possible to write a large number to it. This can
cause an overflow when multiplying ctx->echo_interval by HZ in
match_server().
Add constraints for echo_interval to smb3_fs_context_parse_param().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace.
Fixes: adfeb3e00e ("cifs: Make echo interval tunable")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b4885bd593 upstream.
cifs_server_dbg() implies server to be non-NULL so
move call under condition to avoid NULL pointer dereference.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: e79b0332ae ("cifs: ignore cached share root handle closing errors")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexandra Diupina <adiupina@astralinux.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1821e90be0 upstream.
In a multichannel setup, it was observed that a few fields were not being
copied over to the secondary channels, which impacted performance in cases
where these options were relevant but not properly synchronized. To address
this, this patch introduces copying the following parameters from the
primary channel to the secondary channels:
- min_offload
- compression.requested
- dfs_conn
- ignore_signature
- leaf_fullpath
- noblockcnt
- retrans
- sign
By copying these parameters, we ensure consistency across channels and
prevent performance degradation due to missing or outdated settings.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aman <aman1@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fe4cdc2c4e upstream.
This patch should fix a possible userfaultfd release() hang during
concurrent GUP.
This problem was initially reported by Dimitris Siakavaras in July 2023
[1] in a firecracker use case. Firecracker has a separate process
handling page faults remotely, and when the process releases the
userfaultfd it can race with a concurrent GUP from KVM trying to fault in
a guest page during the secondary MMU page fault process.
A similar problem was reported recently again by Jinjiang Tu in March 2025
[2], even though the race happened this time with a mlockall() operation,
which does GUP in a similar fashion.
In 2017, commit 656710a60e ("userfaultfd: non-cooperative: closing the
uffd without triggering SIGBUS") was trying to fix this issue. AFAIU,
that fixes well the fault paths but may not work yet for GUP. In GUP, the
issue is NOPAGE will be almost treated the same as "page fault resolved"
in faultin_page(), then the GUP will follow page again, seeing page
missing, and it'll keep going into a live lock situation as reported.
This change makes core mm return RETRY instead of NOPAGE for both the GUP
and fault paths, proactively releasing the mmap read lock. This should
guarantee the other release thread make progress on taking the write lock
and avoid the live lock even for GUP.
When at it, rearrange the comments to make sure it's uptodate.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/79375b71-db2e-3e66-346b-254c90d915e2@cslab.ece.ntua.gr
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307072133.3522652-1-tujinjiang@huawei.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250312145131.1143062-1-peterx@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Dimitris Siakavaras <jimsiak@cslab.ece.ntua.gr>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 35fec1089e upstream.
If do_zone_finish() is called with a filesystem that has missing devices
(e.g. a RAID file system mounted in degraded mode) it is accessing the
btrfs_device::zone_info pointer, which will not be set if the device
in question is missing.
Check if the device is present (by checking if it has a valid block device
pointer associated) and if not, skip zone finishing for it.
Fixes: 4dcbb8ab31 ("btrfs: zoned: make zone finishing multi stripe capable")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2bbc4a45e5 upstream.
If btrfs_zone_activate() is called with a filesystem that has missing
devices (e.g. a RAID file system mounted in degraded mode) it is accessing
the btrfs_device::zone_info pointer, which will not be set if the device in
question is missing.
Check if the device is present (by checking if it has a valid block
device pointer associated) and if not, skip zone activation for it.
Fixes: f9a912a3c4 ("btrfs: zoned: make zone activation multi stripe capable")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 009ca35848 upstream.
If we fail to add the chunk map to the fs mapping tree we exit
test_rmap_block() without freeing the chunk map. Fix this by adding a
call to btrfs_free_chunk_map() before exiting the test function if the
call to btrfs_add_chunk_map() failed.
Fixes: 7dc66abb5a ("btrfs: use a dedicated data structure for chunk maps")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.12+
Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4c782247b8 upstream.
At close_ctree() after we have ran delayed iputs either through explicitly
calling btrfs_run_delayed_iputs() or later during the call to
btrfs_commit_super() or btrfs_error_commit_super(), we assert that the
delayed iputs list is empty.
When we have compressed writes this assertion may fail because delayed
iputs may have been added to the list after we last ran delayed iputs.
This happens like this:
1) We have a compressed write bio executing;
2) We enter close_ctree() and flush the fs_info->endio_write_workers
queue which is the queue used for running ordered extent completion;
3) The compressed write bio finishes and enters
btrfs_finish_compressed_write_work(), where it calls
btrfs_finish_ordered_extent() which in turn calls
btrfs_queue_ordered_fn(), which queues a work item in the
fs_info->endio_write_workers queue that we have flushed before;
4) At close_ctree() we proceed, run all existing delayed iputs and
call btrfs_commit_super() (which also runs delayed iputs), but before
we run the following assertion below:
ASSERT(list_empty(&fs_info->delayed_iputs))
A delayed iput is added by the step below...
5) The ordered extent completion job queued in step 3 runs and results in
creating a delayed iput when dropping the last reference of the ordered
extent (a call to btrfs_put_ordered_extent() made from
btrfs_finish_one_ordered());
6) At this point the delayed iputs list is not empty, so the assertion at
close_ctree() fails.
Fix this by flushing the fs_info->compressed_write_workers queue at
close_ctree() before flushing the fs_info->endio_write_workers queue,
respecting the queue dependency as the later is responsible for the
execution of ordered extent completion.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b365b9d404 upstream.
When mounting the same share twice, once with the "linux" mount parameter
(or equivalently "posix") and then once without (or e.g. with "nolinux"),
we were incorrectly reusing the same tree connection for both mounts.
This meant that the first mount of the share on the client, would
cause subsequent mounts of that same share on the same client to
ignore that mount parm ("linux" vs. "nolinux") and incorrectly reuse
the same tcon.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f098aeba04 upstream.
In the case of the following call stack for an atomic file,
FI_DIRTY_INODE is set, but FI_ATOMIC_DIRTIED is not subsequently set.
f2fs_file_write_iter
f2fs_map_blocks
f2fs_reserve_new_blocks
inc_valid_block_count
__mark_inode_dirty(dquot)
f2fs_dirty_inode
If FI_ATOMIC_DIRTIED is not set, atomic file can encounter corruption
due to a mismatch between old file size and new data.
To resolve this issue, I changed to set FI_ATOMIC_DIRTIED when
FI_DIRTY_INODE is set. This ensures that FI_DIRTY_INODE, which was
previously cleared by the Writeback thread during the commit atomic, is
set and i_size is updated.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: fccaa81de8 ("f2fs: prevent atomic file from being dirtied before commit")
Reviewed-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Sunmin Jeong <s_min.jeong@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Yeongjin Gil <youngjin.gil@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Daeho Jeong <daehojeong@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 94824ac9a8 upstream.
Syzkaller detected a use-after-free issue in ext4_insert_dentry that was
caused by out-of-bounds access due to incorrect splitting in do_split.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_insert_dentry+0x36a/0x6d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2109
Write of size 251 at addr ffff888074572f14 by task syz-executor335/5847
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5847 Comm: syz-executor335 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-syzkaller-00318-ga9cda7c0ffed #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
__asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:106
ext4_insert_dentry+0x36a/0x6d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2109
add_dirent_to_buf+0x3d9/0x750 fs/ext4/namei.c:2154
make_indexed_dir+0xf98/0x1600 fs/ext4/namei.c:2351
ext4_add_entry+0x222a/0x25d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2455
ext4_add_nondir+0x8d/0x290 fs/ext4/namei.c:2796
ext4_symlink+0x920/0xb50 fs/ext4/namei.c:3431
vfs_symlink+0x137/0x2e0 fs/namei.c:4615
do_symlinkat+0x222/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4641
__do_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4662 [inline]
__se_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4660 [inline]
__x64_sys_symlink+0x7a/0x90 fs/namei.c:4660
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
The following loop is located right above 'if' statement.
for (i = count-1; i >= 0; i--) {
/* is more than half of this entry in 2nd half of the block? */
if (size + map[i].size/2 > blocksize/2)
break;
size += map[i].size;
move++;
}
'i' in this case could go down to -1, in which case sum of active entries
wouldn't exceed half the block size, but previous behaviour would also do
split in half if sum would exceed at the very last block, which in case of
having too many long name files in a single block could lead to
out-of-bounds access and following use-after-free.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5872331b3d ("ext4: fix potential negative array index in do_split()")
Signed-off-by: Artem Sadovnikov <a.sadovnikov@ispras.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250404082804.2567-3-a.sadovnikov@ispras.ru
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 642335f3ea ]
A file handle that userspace provides to open_by_handle_at() can
legitimately contain an outdated inode number that has since been reused
for another purpose - that's why the file handle also contains a generation
number.
But if the inode number has been reused for an ea_inode, check_igot_inode()
will notice, __ext4_iget() will go through ext4_error_inode(), and if the
inode was newly created, it will also be marked as bad by iget_failed().
This all happens before the point where the inode generation is checked.
ext4_error_inode() is supposed to only be used on filesystem corruption; it
should not be used when userspace just got unlucky with a stale file
handle. So when this happens, let __ext4_iget() just return an error.
Fixes: b3e6bcb945 ("ext4: add EA_INODE checking to ext4_iget()")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241129-ext4-ignore-ea-fhandle-v1-1-e532c0d1cee0@google.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7511e29cf1 ]
As far as I can tell, these calls of list_del_init() on bg_list cannot
run concurrently with btrfs_mark_bg_unused() or btrfs_mark_bg_to_reclaim(),
as they are in transaction error paths and situations where the block
group is readonly.
However, if there is any chance at all of racing with mark_bg_unused(),
or a different future user of bg_list, better to be safe than sorry.
Otherwise we risk the following interleaving (bg_list refcount in parens)
T1 (some random op) T2 (btrfs_mark_bg_unused)
!list_empty(&bg->bg_list); (1)
list_del_init(&bg->bg_list); (1)
list_move_tail (1)
btrfs_put_block_group (0)
btrfs_delete_unused_bgs
bg = list_first_entry
list_del_init(&bg->bg_list);
btrfs_put_block_group(bg); (-1)
Ultimately, this results in a broken ref count that hits zero one deref
early and the real final deref underflows the refcount, resulting in a WARNING.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 19426c4988 ]
This reverts commit 94c821fb28.
It reports that there is potential corruption in node footer,
the most suspious feature is nat_bits, let's revert recovery
related code.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e6494977bd ]
syzbot reports an UBSAN issue as below:
------------[ cut here ]------------
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/f2fs/node.h:381:10
index 18446744073709550692 is out of range for type '__le32[5]' (aka 'unsigned int[5]')
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5318 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00060-g6537cfb395f3 #0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:231 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x121/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:429
get_nid fs/f2fs/node.h:381 [inline]
f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0xa5e/0xf60 fs/f2fs/node.c:1181
f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x782/0x1030 fs/f2fs/file.c:808
f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x10d/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:836
f2fs_truncate+0x417/0x720 fs/f2fs/file.c:886
f2fs_file_write_iter+0x1bdb/0x2550 fs/f2fs/file.c:5093
aio_write+0x56b/0x7c0 fs/aio.c:1633
io_submit_one+0x8a7/0x18a0 fs/aio.c:2052
__do_sys_io_submit fs/aio.c:2111 [inline]
__se_sys_io_submit+0x171/0x2e0 fs/aio.c:2081
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f238798cde9
index 18446744073709550692 (decimal, unsigned long long)
= 0xfffffffffffffc64 (hexadecimal, unsigned long long)
= -924 (decimal, long long)
In f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks(), UBSAN detects that get_nid() tries to
access .i_nid[-924], it means both offset[0] and level should zero.
The possible case should be in f2fs_do_truncate_blocks(), we try to
truncate inode size to zero, however, dn.ofs_in_node is zero and
dn.node_page is not an inode page, so it fails to truncate inode page,
and then pass zeroed free_from to f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks(), result
in this issue.
if (dn.ofs_in_node || IS_INODE(dn.node_page)) {
f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range(&dn, count);
free_from += count;
}
I guess the reason why dn.node_page is not an inode page could be: there
are multiple nat entries share the same node block address, once the node
block address was reused, f2fs_get_node_page() may load a non-inode block.
Let's add a sanity check for such condition to avoid out-of-bounds access
issue.
Reported-by: syzbot+6653f10281a1badc749e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/66fdcdf3.050a0220.40bef.0025.GAE@google.com
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b61e69bb1c ]
syzbot report a deadlock in diFree. [1]
When calling "ioctl$LOOP_SET_STATUS64", the offset value passed in is 4,
which does not match the mounted loop device, causing the mapping of the
mounted loop device to be invalidated.
When creating the directory and creating the inode of iag in diReadSpecial(),
read the page of fixed disk inode (AIT) in raw mode in read_metapage(), the
metapage data it returns is corrupted, which causes the nlink value of 0 to be
assigned to the iag inode when executing copy_from_dinode(), which ultimately
causes a deadlock when entering diFree().
To avoid this, first check the nlink value of dinode before setting iag inode.
[1]
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz-executor301/5309 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index]));
lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index]));
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
5 locks held by syz-executor301/5309:
#0: ffff8880422a4420 (sb_writers#9){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x3f/0x90 fs/namespace.c:515
#1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:850 [inline]
#1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: filename_create+0x260/0x540 fs/namei.c:4026
#2: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630
#3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2460 [inline]
#3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline]
#3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x4b7/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669
#4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2477 [inline]
#4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline]
#4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x869/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5309 Comm: syz-executor301 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_deadlock_bug+0x483/0x620 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3037
check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3089 [inline]
validate_chain+0x15e2/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3891
__lock_acquire+0x1384/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5202
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889
jfs_evict_inode+0x32d/0x440 fs/jfs/inode.c:156
evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:725
diFreeSpecial fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:552 [inline]
duplicateIXtree+0x3c6/0x550 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:3022
diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2597 [inline]
diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline]
diAllocAG+0x17dc/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669
diAlloc+0x1d2/0x1630 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1590
ialloc+0x8f/0x900 fs/jfs/jfs_inode.c:56
jfs_mkdir+0x1c5/0xba0 fs/jfs/namei.c:225
vfs_mkdir+0x2f9/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:4257
do_mkdirat+0x264/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4280
__do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4295 [inline]
__se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4293 [inline]
__x64_sys_mkdirat+0x87/0xa0 fs/namei.c:4293
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Reported-by: syzbot+355da3b3a74881008e8f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=355da3b3a74881008e8f
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7fcbf78962 ]
The JFS filesystem calculates allocation group (AG) size using 1 <<
l2agsize in dbExtendFS(). When l2agsize exceeds 31 (possible with >2TB
aggregates on 32-bit systems), this 32-bit shift operation causes undefined
behavior and improper AG sizing.
On 32-bit architectures:
- Left-shifting 1 by 32+ bits results in 0 due to integer overflow
- This creates invalid AG sizes (0 or garbage values) in
sbi->bmap->db_agsize
- Subsequent block allocations would reference invalid AG structures
- Could lead to:
- Filesystem corruption during extend operations
- Kernel crashes due to invalid memory accesses
- Security vulnerabilities via malformed on-disk structures
Fix by casting to s64 before shifting:
bmp->db_agsize = (s64)1 << l2agsize;
This ensures 64-bit arithmetic even on 32-bit architectures. The cast
matches the data type of db_agsize (s64) and follows similar patterns in
JFS block calculation code.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Signed-off-by: Rand Deeb <rand.sec96@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 70ca3246ad ]
The expression "inactags << bmp->db_agl2size" in the function
dbFinalizeBmap() is computed using int operands. Although the
values (inactags and db_agl2size) are derived from filesystem
parameters and are usually small, there is a theoretical risk that
the shift could overflow a 32-bit int if extreme values occur.
According to the C standard, shifting a signed 32-bit int can lead
to undefined behavior if the result exceeds its range. In our
case, an overflow could miscalculate free blocks, potentially
leading to erroneous filesystem accounting.
To ensure the arithmetic is performed in 64-bit space, we cast
"inactags" to s64 before shifting. This defensive fix prevents any
risk of overflow and complies with kernel coding best practices.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Signed-off-by: Rand Deeb <rand.sec96@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9629d7d66c ]
syzbot reports that hex_dump_to_buffer is using uninit-value:
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hex_dump_to_buffer+0x888/0x1100 lib/hexdump.c:171
hex_dump_to_buffer+0x888/0x1100 lib/hexdump.c:171
print_hex_dump+0x13d/0x3e0 lib/hexdump.c:276
diFree+0x5ba/0x4350 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:876
jfs_evict_inode+0x510/0x550 fs/jfs/inode.c:156
evict+0x723/0xd10 fs/inode.c:796
iput_final fs/inode.c:1946 [inline]
iput+0x97b/0xdb0 fs/inode.c:1972
txUpdateMap+0xf3e/0x1150 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2367
txLazyCommit fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2664 [inline]
jfs_lazycommit+0x627/0x11d0 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2733
kthread+0x6b9/0xef0 kernel/kthread.c:464
ret_from_fork+0x6d/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4121 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4164 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x8e3/0xdf0 mm/slub.c:4320
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:901 [inline]
diMount+0x61/0x7f0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:105
jfs_mount+0xa8e/0x11d0 fs/jfs/jfs_mount.c:176
jfs_fill_super+0xa47/0x17c0 fs/jfs/super.c:523
get_tree_bdev_flags+0x6ec/0x910 fs/super.c:1636
get_tree_bdev+0x37/0x50 fs/super.c:1659
jfs_get_tree+0x34/0x40 fs/jfs/super.c:635
vfs_get_tree+0xb1/0x5a0 fs/super.c:1814
do_new_mount+0x71f/0x15e0 fs/namespace.c:3560
path_mount+0x742/0x1f10 fs/namespace.c:3887
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3900 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4111 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x71f/0x800 fs/namespace.c:4088
__x64_sys_mount+0xe4/0x150 fs/namespace.c:4088
x64_sys_call+0x39bf/0x3c30 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:166
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
=====================================================
The reason is that imap is not properly initialized after memory
allocation. It will cause the snprintf() function to write uninitialized
data into linebuf within hex_dump_to_buffer().
Fix this by using kzalloc instead of kmalloc to clear its content at the
beginning in diMount().
Signed-off-by: Zhongqiu Han <quic_zhonhan@quicinc.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+df6cdcb35904203d2b6d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/67b5d07e.050a0220.14d86d.00e6.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f381640e1b ]
... except when the table is known to be only used by one thread.
A file pointer can get installed at any moment despite the ->file_lock
being held since the following:
8a81252b77 ("fs/file.c: don't acquire files->file_lock in fd_install()")
Accesses subject to such a race can in principle suffer load tearing.
While here redo the comment in dup_fd -- it only covered a race against
files showing up, still assuming fd_install() takes the lock.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250313135725.1320914-1-mjguzik@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 8a388c1fab upstream.
NFSD sends CB_RECALL_ANY to clients when the server is low on
memory or that client has a large number of delegations outstanding.
We've seen cases where NFSD attempts to send CB_RECALL_ANY requests
to disconnected clients, and gets confused. These calls never go
anywhere if a backchannel transport to the target client isn't
available. Before the server can send any backchannel operation, the
client has to connect first and then do a BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION.
This patch doesn't address the root cause of the confusion, but
there's no need to queue up these optional operations if they can't
go anywhere.
Fixes: 44df6f439a ("NFSD: add delegation reaper to react to low memory condition")
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 370345b4bd upstream.
RFC 8881 Section 18.25.4 paragraph 5 tells us that the server
should return NFS4ERR_FILE_OPEN only if the target object is an
opened file. This suggests that returning this status when removing
a directory will confuse NFS clients.
This is a version-specific issue; nfsd_proc_remove/rmdir() and
nfsd3_proc_remove/rmdir() already return nfserr_access as
appropriate.
Unfortunately there is no quick way for nfsd4_remove() to determine
whether the target object is a file or not, so the check is done in
in nfsd_unlink() for now.
Reported-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com>
Fixes: 466e16f092 ("nfsd: check for EBUSY from vfs_rmdir/vfs_unink.")
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d7d8e3169b upstream.
If fh_fill_pre_attrs() returns a non-zero status, the error flow
takes it through out_unlock, which then overwrites the returned
status code with
err = nfserrno(host_err);
Fixes: a332018a91 ("nfsd: handle failure to collect pre/post-op attrs more sanely")
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 230ca75845 upstream.
Before calling nfsd4_run_cb to queue dl_recall to the callback_wq, we
increment the reference count of dl_stid.
We expect that after the corresponding work_struct is processed, the
reference count of dl_stid will be decremented through the callback
function nfsd4_cb_recall_release.
However, if the call to nfsd4_run_cb fails, the incremented reference
count of dl_stid will not be decremented correspondingly, leading to the
following nfs4_stid leak:
unreferenced object 0xffff88812067b578 (size 344):
comm "nfsd", pid 2761, jiffies 4295044002 (age 5541.241s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 6b 6b 6b 6b b8 02 c0 e2 81 88 ff ff ....kkkk........
00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de .kkkkkkk.....N..
backtrace:
kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b9/0x700
nfsd4_process_open1+0x34/0x300
nfsd4_open+0x2d1/0x9d0
nfsd4_proc_compound+0x7a2/0xe30
nfsd_dispatch+0x241/0x3e0
svc_process_common+0x5d3/0xcc0
svc_process+0x2a3/0x320
nfsd+0x180/0x2e0
kthread+0x199/0x1d0
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
unreferenced object 0xffff8881499f4d28 (size 368):
comm "nfsd", pid 2761, jiffies 4295044005 (age 5541.239s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 4d 9f 49 81 88 ff ff ........0M.I....
30 4d 9f 49 81 88 ff ff 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 0M.I.... .......
backtrace:
kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b9/0x700
nfs4_alloc_stid+0x29/0x210
alloc_init_deleg+0x92/0x2e0
nfs4_set_delegation+0x284/0xc00
nfs4_open_delegation+0x216/0x3f0
nfsd4_process_open2+0x2b3/0xee0
nfsd4_open+0x770/0x9d0
nfsd4_proc_compound+0x7a2/0xe30
nfsd_dispatch+0x241/0x3e0
svc_process_common+0x5d3/0xcc0
svc_process+0x2a3/0x320
nfsd+0x180/0x2e0
kthread+0x199/0x1d0
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
Fix it by checking the result of nfsd4_run_cb and call nfs4_put_stid if
fail to queue dl_recall.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d1bc15b147 upstream.
The pynfs DELEG8 test fails when run against nfsd. It acquires a
delegation and then lets the lease time out. It then tries to use the
deleg stateid and expects to see NFS4ERR_DELEG_REVOKED, but it gets
bad NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID instead.
When a delegation is revoked, it's initially marked with
SC_STATUS_REVOKED, or SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED and later, it's marked
with the SC_STATUS_FREEABLE flag, which denotes that it is waiting for
s FREE_STATEID call.
nfs4_lookup_stateid() accepts a statusmask that includes the status
flags that a found stateid is allowed to have. Currently, that mask
never includes SC_STATUS_FREEABLE, which means that revoked delegations
are (almost) never found.
Add SC_STATUS_FREEABLE to the always-allowed status flags, and remove it
from nfsd4_delegreturn() since it's now always implied.
Fixes: 8dd91e8d31 ("nfsd: fix race between laundromat and free_stateid")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a8dfb21689 upstream.
If the file system is corrupted, the header.stblindex variable
may become greater than 127. Because of this, an array access out
of bounds may occur:
------------[ cut here ]------------
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3096:10
index 237 is out of range for type 'struct dtslot[128]'
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5822 Comm: syz-executor740 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00110-g4099a71718b0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:231 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x121/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:429
dtReadFirst+0x622/0xc50 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3096
dtReadNext fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3147 [inline]
jfs_readdir+0x9aa/0x3c50 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:2862
wrap_directory_iterator+0x91/0xd0 fs/readdir.c:65
iterate_dir+0x571/0x800 fs/readdir.c:108
__do_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:403 [inline]
__se_sys_getdents64+0x1e2/0x4b0 fs/readdir.c:389
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
---[ end trace ]---
Add a stblindex check for corruption.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+9120834fc227768625ba@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9120834fc227768625ba
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fdf480da58 upstream.
During the "size_check" label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended
attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs
"ea_get: invalid extended attribute" and calls print_hex_dump().
Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds
INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped:
int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper
limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads
"size" to wrap around and become negative (-184549328).
The "size" is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called "len" in
print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned
type), this is then stored inside a variable called
"int remaining", which is then assigned to "int linelen" which
is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump()
the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is
18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer()
on each iteration:
for (i = 0; i < len; i += rowsize) {
linelen = min(remaining, rowsize);
remaining -= rowsize;
hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize,
linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii);
...
}
The expected stopping condition (i < len) is effectively broken
since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to
the "ptr+i" being passed to hex_dump_to_buffer() to get closer
to the end of the actual bounds of "ptr", eventually an out of
bounds access is done in hex_dump_to_buffer() in the following
for loop:
for (j = 0; j < len; j++) {
if (linebuflen < lx + 2)
goto overflow2;
ch = ptr[j];
...
}
To fix this we should validate "EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)"
before it is utilised.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e6e7e4279d046613bc5
Fixes: d9f9d96136 ("jfs: xattr: check invalid xattr size more strictly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Qasim Ijaz <qasdev00@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d5e206778e upstream.
Mounting a corrupted filesystem with directory which contains '.' dir
entry with rec_len == block size results in out-of-bounds read (later
on, when the corrupted directory is removed).
ext4_empty_dir() assumes every ext4 directory contains at least '.'
and '..' as directory entries in the first data block. It first loads
the '.' dir entry, performs sanity checks by calling ext4_check_dir_entry()
and then uses its rec_len member to compute the location of '..' dir
entry (in ext4_next_entry). It assumes the '..' dir entry fits into the
same data block.
If the rec_len of '.' is precisely one block (4KB), it slips through the
sanity checks (it is considered the last directory entry in the data
block) and leaves "struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de" point exactly past the
memory slot allocated to the data block. The following call to
ext4_check_dir_entry() on new value of de then dereferences this pointer
which results in out-of-bounds mem access.
Fix this by extending __ext4_check_dir_entry() to check for '.' dir
entries that reach the end of data block. Make sure to ignore the phony
dir entries for checksum (by checking name_len for non-zero).
Note: This is reported by KASAN as use-after-free in case another
structure was recently freed from the slot past the bound, but it is
really an OOB read.
This issue was found by syzkaller tool.
Call Trace:
[ 38.594108] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.594649] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88802b41a004 by task syz-executor/5375
[ 38.595158]
[ 38.595288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5375 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7 #1
[ 38.595298] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 38.595304] Call Trace:
[ 38.595308] <TASK>
[ 38.595311] dump_stack_lvl+0xa7/0xd0
[ 38.595325] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3f0
[ 38.595339] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.595349] print_report+0xaa/0x250
[ 38.595359] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.595368] ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x9/0x90
[ 38.595378] kasan_report+0xab/0xe0
[ 38.595389] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.595400] __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710
[ 38.595410] ext4_empty_dir+0x465/0x990
[ 38.595421] ? __pfx_ext4_empty_dir+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595432] ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x29a/0xd10
[ 38.595441] ? __dquot_initialize+0x2a7/0xbf0
[ 38.595455] ? __pfx_ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595464] ? __pfx___dquot_initialize+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595478] ? down_write+0xdb/0x140
[ 38.595487] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595497] ext4_rmdir+0xee/0x140
[ 38.595506] vfs_rmdir+0x209/0x670
[ 38.595517] ? lookup_one_qstr_excl+0x3b/0x190
[ 38.595529] do_rmdir+0x363/0x3c0
[ 38.595537] ? __pfx_do_rmdir+0x10/0x10
[ 38.595544] ? strncpy_from_user+0x1ff/0x2e0
[ 38.595561] __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xf0/0x130
[ 38.595570] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
[ 38.595583] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Fixes: ac27a0ec11 ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs <acsjakub@amazon.de>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mahmoud Adam <mngyadam@amazon.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b3ae36a6794c4a01944c7d70b403db5b@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f87d3af741 upstream.
This fixes an analogus bug that was fixed in xfs in commit
4b8d867ca6 ("xfs: don't over-report free space or inodes in
statvfs") where statfs can report misleading / incorrect information
where project quota is enabled, and the free space is less than the
remaining quota.
This commit will resolve a test failure in generic/762 which tests for
this bug.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 689c958cbe ("ext4: add project quota support")
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 59c30e3142 upstream.
If there is no error, get_block() should return 0. However, when bh_read()
returns 1, get_block() also returns 1 in the same manner.
Let's set err to 0, if there is no error from bh_read()
Fixes: 11a347fb6c ("exfat: change to get file size from DataLength")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuezhang Mo <Yuezhang.Mo@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1bb7ff4204 upstream.
When get_block is called with a buffer_head allocated on the stack, such
as do_mpage_readpage, stack corruption due to buffer_head UAF may occur in
the following race condition situation.
<CPU 0> <CPU 1>
mpage_read_folio
<<bh on stack>>
do_mpage_readpage
exfat_get_block
bh_read
__bh_read
get_bh(bh)
submit_bh
wait_on_buffer
...
end_buffer_read_sync
__end_buffer_read_notouch
unlock_buffer
<<keep going>>
...
...
...
...
<<bh is not valid out of mpage_read_folio>>
.
.
another_function
<<variable A on stack>>
put_bh(bh)
atomic_dec(bh->b_count)
* stack corruption here *
This patch returns -EAGAIN if a folio does not have buffers when bh_read
needs to be called. By doing this, the caller can fallback to functions
like block_read_full_folio(), create a buffer_head in the folio, and then
call get_block again.
Let's do not call bh_read() with on-stack buffer_head.
Fixes: 11a347fb6c ("exfat: change to get file size from DataLength")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Yeongjin Gil <youngjin.gil@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Yuezhang Mo <Yuezhang.Mo@sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c8b5b7c5da upstream.
The Client send malformed smb2 negotiate request. ksmbd return error
response. Subsequently, the client can send smb2 session setup even
thought conn->preauth_info is not allocated.
This patch add KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP status of connection to ignore
session setup request if smb2 negotiate phase is not complete.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-26505
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
